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Even when we are ostensibly doing “nothing”—as during states of rest, sleep, and
reverie—the brain continues to process information. In resting wakefulness, the mind
generates thoughts, plans for the future, and imagines fictitious scenarios. In sleep, when
the demands of sensory input are reduced, our experience turns to the thoughts and
images we call “dreaming.” Far from being a meaningless distraction, the content of these
subjective experiences provides an important and unique source of information about
the activities of the resting mind and brain. In both wakefulness and sleep, spontaneous
experience combines recent and remote memory fragments into novel scenarios. These
conscious experiences may reflect the consolidation of recent memory into long-term
storage, an adaptive process that functions to extract general knowledge about the
world and adaptively respond to future events. Recent examples from psychology and
neuroscience demonstrate that the use of subjective report can provide clues to the
function(s) of rest and sleep.
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Traditionally, science has studied the human mind by observ-
ing how research participants respond to external stimuli. In
the course of a day, however, we spend surprisingly little time
actively attending to stimuli in our immediate environment. First,
during our waking hours, we spend about half of our time think-
ing about something other than our immediate surroundings—
“daydreaming” or “mind-wandering” (Killingsworth and Gilbert,
2010). Beyond this, we spend nearly a third of our lives sleeping.
Yet the activity of the brain, as well as our accompanying stream
of consciousness, persists throughout all these states of wakeful-
ness and sleep. Here, several recent lines of evidence are described
suggesting that dreaming and waking consciousness are not nec-
essarily generated by independent mechanisms, running contrary
to centuries of dogma on the fundamental nature of dreaming.
Conscious experience during sleep (i.e., dreaming) has clas-
sically been considered a phenomenon entirely distinct from
the spontaneous thought and imagery of wakefulness. But to
the contrary, emerging evidence suggests that dream experiences
may best be conceptualized as a natural extension of waking
consciousness, overlapping in both phenomenology and neu-
ral mechanism (Wamsley and Stickgold, 2010; Domhoff, 2011;
Horikawa et al., 2013). In both resting wakefulness and sleep,
the mind/brain is hard at work processing the day’s events
and concerns—consolidating memory (Plihal and Born, 1997;
Mednick et al., 2002; Tucker et al., 2006), integrating new infor-
mation with our existing knowledge (Tamminen et al., 2010;
Lewis and Durrant, 2011), and perhaps even using past experi-
ence to plan for the future (Wilhelm et al., 2011). While dreaming
and mind wandering are not necessarily functional in and of
themselves, as described below, emerging evidence suggests that
these conscious experiences are influenced by the neurophysi-
ological functions of the resting and sleeping brain. Thus, the
systematic study of subjective experience, across all states of con-
sciousness, may prove crucial to a broader understanding of the
brain function during “offline” states.
TOWARD A VIEW OF DREAMING AS A NORMAL FUNCTION
OF THE BRAIN
Scientific progress in understanding dream consciousness has
been woefully impeded by classical conceptions of dreams as a
“mysterious” and “unknowable” phenomenon resistant to empir-
ical investigation. This view is rooted in traditions that extend
back thousands of years and still dominate popular conceptions
of dreaming today. Even today, conscious experience during sleep
is most often viewed as originating in mechanisms separate from
those that generate normal waking thought and perception. In
ancient cultures, this was expressed in the view that dreams orig-
inate outside the individual as divine messages from gods or
spirits. In ancient Greece, for example, citizens suffering from
physical ailments would flock to healing temples of the god
Asclepius, where they would sleep and receive a divine dream that
prescribed (upon interpretation by a priest) a treatment for their
condition.
In the early 20th century, the development of psychoana-
lytic dream theory was ostensibly a break from the superstitious
traditions of the past, offering a scientific method of analyz-
ing dreams from a psychological perspective. Yet this paradigm
still placed the origin of dreams in a mechanism outside of the
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traditionally conceived “self”—now dreams came from the mys-
terious “unconscious mind,” inaccessible during normal wake-
fulness and rife with sources of pathology. Adding another layer
of obscurity is the problematic notion that a dream experience
can and should be “interpreted.” Despite thousands of years of
dream interpretation, and the proliferation of dream symbol dic-
tionaries on bookstore shelves, there is no systematic empirical
evidence that dreams contain symbols to any greater degree than
our typical waking thoughts, let alone has there been any empir-
ical support for a particular system to “decode” these symbols.
Although Freudian concepts of dreaming have now fallen out
of favor in many parts of the psychological community, there
has not been a widely accepted new theory of dreaming to take
its place.
Of course, it is not surprising that the question of dream
consciousness received little scientific attention during the early-
to-mid 20th century, when behaviorism dominated the landscape
of psychological research. Following the cognitive revolution,
however, as psychologists and neuroscientists moved forward
with studying internal states such as emotion, recollection, atten-
tion, and consciousness, there was little parallel boom of research
into subjective states during sleep (Figure 1). Thus, although
cognitive neuroscientists have become increasingly comfortable
with using introspective self-report to study wakefulness, con-
scious experience during dreaming has continued to be treated
as a “special case” placed outside the purview of scientific
investigation.
Even Alan Hobson’s influential neurobiological theories of
dreaming (Hobson and McCarley, 1977; Hobson et al., 2000)
continued the historical thread of postulating a “special” mecha-
nism for dream generation, non-overlapping with those involved
FIGURE 1 | The cognitive revolution has overlooked sleep. The cognitive
revolution set off a research boom into a variety of long-neglected topics
dealing with subjective experience during wakefulness, yet conscious
experience during sleep and dreaming have not been targets of a
comparable research surge. Counts represent the number of PubMed
citations containing the keywords “cognition,” “emotion,” “consciousness”
or “dreaming” (within all database fields and MeSH terms) for each year
1920–2003. The search for “dreaming” also included citations containing
the MeSH term “dreams.” Both research articles and reviews are included
in the citation counts.
in waking mentation—In this case, the mechanism proposed was
activity in the pontine brainstem occurring exclusively during the
REM (rapid eye movement) phase of sleep. It is now clear, how-
ever, that participants recall dreaming from 50% ormore of awak-
enings outside of REM sleep as well (Foulkes, 1962, 1967; Nielsen,
2000), including even during the deepest stages of slow wave
sleep (SWS) (Cavallero et al., 1992; Cicogna et al., 2000). Thus,
an eventual cognitive neuroscience of dream consciousness must
invoke mechanisms that span across all of the classical “stages” of
sleep.
Indeed, in the second half of the 20th century, several the-
orists began to describe dreaming as a variant of thought and
imagery generation that spans the states of wakefulness, REM,
and NREM. The seminal work of Calvin Hall, for example, was
novel in presenting dream content as a relatively transparent
reflection of a dreamers’ waking life, rather than a mysteri-
ous psychological phenomenon specific to the sleep state (Hall,
1953). Later, the work of Antrobus (Antrobus, 1983, 1991; Reinsel
et al., 1992) and Foulkes (1962, 1967) was central in establish-
ing that forms of complex, dreamlike mental activity occurred
continuously throughout sleep onset, NREM sleep stages, and
even resting wakefulness, suggesting dreaming as a point on a
continuum of forms of experience, rather than a phenomenon
peculiar to one sleep state. More recent theories have con-
tinued to stress how the generation of dream consciousness
is related to the neurobiology and cognitive structure of the
waking brain (Cicogna and Bosinelli, 2001; Nir and Tononi,
2010; Wamsley and Stickgold, 2010; Perogamvros and Schwartz,
2012).
Several recent lines of evidence continue to suggest that dream
consciousness is generated by the same basic neural substrate
that supports spontaneous subjective experience during “offline”
states of resting wakefulness.
COMPARING CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE IN RESTING
WAKEFULNESS AND SLEEP
One reason why dreaming has typically been treated separately
from waking conscious experience is that there is assumed to be
a bizarre, hallucinatory, and cognitively-deficient phenomenol-
ogy of dreaming that clearly places it in a separate class of
experience. But what is conscious experience really like dur-
ing sleep, and how does this differ from waking thought and
imagery? Certainly, experience changes as we move through
different states of consciousness—in comparing the form that
experience takes during sleep, relative to wakefulness, perhaps
the most noteworthy changes are an increase in the vividness
of perceptual imagery coupled with attenuated awareness of
the outside world (Hobson et al., 2000). Considering the dras-
tic changes in neuromodulation, electrophysiology, and regional
brain activation that accompany the onset of sleep, it is certainly
not surprising that a corresponding shift in phenomenology
would occur. However, despite clear differences between wak-
ing mind-wandering and dreaming during sleep, there is little
evidence to suggest that conscious experience during dreaming
is generated by a fundamentally different mechanism than dur-
ing wakefulness. To the contrary, the available data suggest that
dreaming during sleep overlaps in both phenomenology and
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neural mechanism with spontaneous mentation during offline
wakefulness.
Debating whether dream consciousness and waking con-
sciousness are “more similar” or “more different” is a futile
enterprise. It is clear that both differences and similarities exist,
but tabulating which list has a greater number of items will not
necessarily allow us to draw any strong conclusions. Nonetheless,
it is important to note that the form and content of conscious
experience in wake and sleep do overlap—subjective reports from
these different states can, in fact, be so similar as to be indis-
tinguishable. Very vivid, even hallucinatory perceptual imagery,
for example, is sometimes described in reports of waking day-
dreams (Foulkes and Scott, 1973; Foulkes and Fleisher, 1975).
Meanwhile, dreams from sleep are not necessarily more “bizarre”
than waking mentation. In fact, by one measure, waking fantasy
is more “bizarre” than dreaming—the number of sudden “dis-
continuous” shifts in topic is actually greater in reports of waking
fantasy than in dreaming (Wollman and Antrobus, 1986; Reinsel
et al., 1992). Conversely, cognition during sleep can be surpris-
ingly logical and coherent, including self-reflection, planning,
and focused attention (Kahan et al., 1997; Kahan and LaBerge,
2011).
As an illustrative example of the substantial overlap between
waking mentation reports and dreaming, below are two ver-
bal reports from a single participant, one collected from rest-
ing wakefulness before sleep and one from Stage 2 NREM
sleep:
I was picturing the dining room at my house. Uh, it’s kind of small
because we have a very big table in there; there’s about 7 or 8
chairs around it and there’s another big mirror on the wall, and
it’s blue – the room is blue. And, um, there’s a smaller mirror with
a gold frame to the left of the bigger mirror, and you can see into the
kitchen from the dining room. There’s a little hallway that leads into
it. (Resting Wake)
I was thinking about. . . I was in a room and there was someone from
my Italian class there, but um, that’s it. . . and there were tables and
chairs in the room—kind of set up like desks, but that’s it. (Stage 2
NREM Sleep)
In REM sleep, dream experiences are often longer, more vivid,
and more “bizarre” than the examples above. But this is not nec-
essarily the case. Although dream reports from REM are on aver-
age longer and more detailed than those collected from NREM
sleep, these distributions have substantial overlap (Foulkes, 1962,
1967; Antrobus et al., 1995; Cicogna et al., 1998; Smith et al.,
2004; Wamsley et al., 2007). Importantly, many other appar-
ent differences between REM and NREM dreaming (e.g., the
amount of “bizarre content,” or the number of events and actions)
can be accounted for merely by their greater length (Antrobus,
1983).
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF SUBJECTIVE
EXPERIENCE ACROSS STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Dreaming has also been considered outside the range of nor-
mal brain function because, by all outward appearances, the
brain and mind are entirely “turned off” during sleep. Indeed,
until the 1950’s the predominant view of sleep was that of a
global state of inactivity, where little or no brain and cogni-
tive processing was occurring. The presence of complex thought
and imagery was not easily reconciled with this classical view
of the sleeping brain. However, following the advent of all-
night EEG recording, and more recently using PET and fMRI
neuroimaging, we can now see that the sleeping brain remains
very active by several measures. The fast, desynchronized EEG
of REM sleep, for example, so resembles that of waking brain
activity that this state was initially termed “paradoxical sleep.”
Even in the classically “deeper” stages of NREM sleep, neu-
roimaging studies show that regional metabolic activity is main-
tained in selected regions (Nofzinger et al., 2002; Peigneux et al.,
2004).
Recent imaging studies have described a consistent pattern
of brain activity present during resting wakefulness that over-
laps substantially with activity patterns during sleep [the “default
network” (Buckner et al., 2008), see Figure 2]. Memory-related
regions in the medial temporal and medial frontal regions are
amongst the components of this that remain relatively active dur-
ing both REM and NREM sleep (see Domhoff, 2011 for a recent
theoretical paper). During wakefulness, activation of the default
network is associated with the generation of conscious thought
and imagery (Mason et al., 2007; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010;
Andrews-Hanna, 2012). For example, default network activity is
enhanced under conditions of reduced sensory monitoring that
increase stimulus-independent thoughts (Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2010). Furthermore, individuals reporting more task irrelevant
thoughts of the past and future during a resting condition exhib-
ited increased functional connectivity between medial temporal
lobe structures and other components of the default network
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). Finally, default network activa-
tion is also greater in individuals with a strong trait propensity
toward daydreaming (Mason et al., 2007). Thus, it appears that
there is some structural and functional commonality between
FIGURE 2 | The “Default Network” of brain function. Functional imaging
studies have identified a consistent network of brain regions that are
preferentially active during periods of waking rest, when participants are
not engaged in processing external stimuli. Several of these same regions
remain relatively active during sleep, including medial frontal and medial
temporal networks involved in memory processing. (Adapted with
permission from Buckner et al., 2008).
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the “default mode” of resting wakefulness and patterns of pre-
served functional activation during sleep. The analogy, however,
is not complete. First, parietal regions that form a major com-
ponent of the waking default network are relatively inactive
during both REM and NREM sleep. Second, functional connec-
tivity between default network regions, which is a fundamental
feature of how this network is defined during wakefulness, is
altered as we enter sleep (Koike et al., 2011; Sämann et al.,
2011).
The relationship of default network activity to dream-
ing during sleep has not yet been directly tested. However,
there is some preliminary evidence that particular regions
of this network contribute to dream generation. For exam-
ple, neuropsychologist Mark Solms has described lesions of
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex which lead to a reported
cessation of dreaming in affected patients (Solms, 2000).
Also, recordings of intracranial EEG in epilepsy patients have
demonstrated a relationship between hippocampal activity dur-
ing sleep and the recall of dream experience (Fell et al.,
2006).
Thus, despite the apparent inactivity of the sleeping body,
and in the face of major neurophysiological changes, regional
patterns of brain activity remain partially stable across the tran-
sition from resting wakefulness to sleep. During wakefulness,
the co-activation of these brain regions is associated with the
generation of thought, imagery, and daydreaming. If this func-
tional network is similarly associated with conscious experiences
arising during sleep, this would constitute evidence of a shared
network for the generation of spontaneous subjective expe-
rience, which with some modification, spans across states of
consciousness.
IN WAKE AND SLEEP, SPONTANEOUS CONSCIOUS
EXPERIENCE REFLECTS PROCESSING PAST MEMORY AND
PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE
Cognitive neuroscience has now begun to study spontaneous
experience during wakefulness in earnest. Emerging data show
that far from being a meaningless distraction, so-called “day-
dreams” provide an important source of information about the
activities of the resting brain. One line of this work has been
stimulated by interest in the aforementioned “default network”—
during periods of quiet rest, activation of the default network
(which includes several memory-related regions) is associated
with remembering past events, but also with imagining pos-
sible future events (Addis et al., 2007; Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2010; Andrews-Hanna, 2012). These observations have led to
the hypothesis that one function of the brain during rest is
to use past memories in constructing simulations of possible
futures, enhancing preparedness for future events (Schacter et al.,
2007). Also in support of this hypothesis, patients with bilat-
eral damage to the hippocampus (a structure in the medial
temporal lobe essential for forming new memories) show not
only memory impairments, but are also impaired in their abil-
ity to imagine fictitious scenarios and possible futures (Hassabis
et al., 2007; Race et al., 2012). Together, with other evidence,
these observations suggest that during periods of unoccupied
rest, fragments of past experience are reactivated in our minds,
and combined into novel imagined scenarios of possible future
events.
Several lines of evidence suggest that dream experience may
similarly reflect the processing of past memory, as well as the
use of memory to simulate future events. First, there is now very
strong evidence that sleep is beneficial for the “consolidation”
of newly acquired information. For both procedural (Stickgold
et al., 2000a; Walker et al., 2002) and declarative (Plihal and
Born, 1997; Ellenbogen et al., 2006; Tucker et al., 2006) forms
of memory, post-learning sleep has consistently been shown to
enhance later memory performance. Furthermore, the process-
ing of memory during sleep appears to be directly reflected in
the conscious experience of dreaming. Although past experiences
are rarely, if ever, “replayed” in dreams in their complete and
original form, nonetheless, a majority of dream reports con-
tain at least one element which can be traced back to a specific
recent memory (Fosse et al., 2003). Participants also very often
dream about experimental learning tasks (Tauber et al., 1968;
Stickgold et al., 2000b; Wamsley et al., 2010a,b; Kusse et al.,
2011), and crucially, participants who incorporate learning tasks
into their dream content show enhanced memory for the mate-
rial following sleep (Fiss et al., 1977; De Koninck et al., 1990;
Wamsley et al., 2010b). Thus, although the content of dreams
is unlikely to be exclusively determined by memory-related pro-
cesses [for example, dreaming may also be influenced by moti-
vational and reward systems (Pennartz et al., 2004; Perogamvros
and Schwartz, 2012)], it appears that the consolidation of mem-
ory during sleep is one contributor to the construction of dream
experience.
Like waking daydreams, there is some preliminary evidence
that dreaming during sleep also reflects prospective memory
functions, as the brain uses past experience to prepare us for
the future. First, we know that sleep does not enhance all past
memories equally, but instead selectively strengthens memory for
information that is relevant to the future. For example, one recent
study found that sleep only enhanced memory when partici-
pants expected to be tested the learned information the following
morning (Wilhelm et al., 2011). Similarly, sleep preferentially
enhances emotional memories (Payne et al., 2008) and memories
that participants expect to be rewarded for remembering (Fischer
and Born, 2009). Each of these studies illustrates a selective effect
of sleep in enhancing memory for information that is impor-
tant to an individual’s future. At the same time, it has long been
known that the simulation of potential futures forms a substan-
tial part of dream content. For example, Antti Revonsuo’s “threat
simulation” theory of dreaming builds on evidence that poten-
tially threatening events are played out in imagined scenarios
during dreams (Valli and Revonsuo, 2009). As another exam-
ple, in our own studies using the downhill skiing arcade game
Alpine Racer II, we found that during a baseline recording night,
a small but significant portion (4%) of dream reports anticipated
playing Alpine Racer the following day, even though participants
had never yet seen the game. Taken together, these observations
suggest the hypothesis that both spontaneous mentation during
relaxed wakefulness and dreaming during sleepmay be influenced
by the same brain processes: the consolidation of past memory
and constructive simulation of future events.
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SPONTANEOUS SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AS A TOOL FOR
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
Studies of emotion, memory, decision-making, perception, and
consciousness routinely rely on participants’ own description
of their internal states. Despite the unverifiable nature of
such reports, progress in understanding human cognition has
immensely benefitted from the use of subjective report as a
scientific tool. Why should dreaming be treated any differ-
ently? Indeed, open-ended subjective reports from quiet rest
and sleep were essential to much of the research described
above. Self-report of ongoing conscious experience provides a
method of determining whether a specific memory is being reac-
tivated in the resting brain (Wamsley et al., 2010a,b), and offers
insight into other brain and cognitive processes which occur-
ring during rest (e.g., future projection, Andrews-Hanna, 2012)
and sleep (e.g., reward processing, Perogamvros and Schwartz,
2012).
Importantly, there is as yet no measure of brain activity
(e.g., EEG, fMRI, PET) that can demonstrate the reactiva-
tion of a specific memory trace in the brain during human
rest or sleep. For example, while an increase in hippocam-
pal activity during sleep might indicate that memory process-
ing is occurring (e.g., Peigneux et al., 2004), it cannot tell us
whether a participant is reactivating the memory of a specific
image, word, or thought. Emerging analytic techniques such
as multivoxel pattern analysis of the fMRI BOLD signal show
immense potential for decoding the neural correlates of recol-
lecting a specific experience (Chadwick et al., 2010), but thus
far, their application to defining offline memory reactivation
remains in its infancy [though see (Horikawa et al., 2013)].
The conscious retrieval of a recent memory, in contrast, clearly
demonstrates that the neural networks encoding that particu-
lar memory have been reactivated. Thus, reports of conscious
experience offer a valuable source of information about the
activity of the resting brain, allowing us to determine which
memories of everyday waking experience are spontaneously reac-
tivated during offline states of quiet rest and sleep. Regardless
of future progress in “decoding” experience based on brain
signals, subjective report will continue to provide a valuable
window into the cognitive processes occurring during offline
states.
Of course, subjective report of experience during sleep does
present some unique methodological challenges. As with all sub-
jective report data, we have access only to a participant’s report of
their recent experience, and no objective confirmation is available
[although see (Horikawa et al., 2013)]. In dealing with reports of
dream experience, this fundamental challenge is compounded by
two additional factors—First, verbal reports of experience dur-
ing sleep are necessarily given retrospectively, elicited only after a
participant is awakened and entered a different state of conscious-
ness. Second, memory for dream experiences is poor, relative
to memory for waking experience. However, despite the quan-
titative reduction in recall of experience from sleep, there is no
evidence that memory for sleep experiences is inherently less
accurate than that for waking experience, and thus, there is no
reason that such challenges should prevent us from utilizing these
valuable data. Just as the challenges of subjective report have not
prevented progress in the study of emotion, memory, and con-
sciousness, neither should the limitations of self-report prevent
us from studying subjective experience during sleep.
Dreams are not sent to us by the gods, nor are they a disguised
message from the unconscious mind. Generated by the same
mind and brain that create our waking conscious experience,
dreams bear a transparent relationship to waking experience, and
provide a useful window into activities of the sleeping brain.
Because of this, introspective self-report is a valuable tool for the
cognitive neurosciences. Moving into the future, the integration
of behavioral, neural, and subjective data will enable us to map
the structure, and potential function(s), of spontaneous thought
across all states of consciousness.
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